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iii Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation is a serious threat to the security of the United States and the world. For the operational commander supporting national strategy the interdiction of WMD materials is a complex mission that requires the capability to exchange timely information with coalition nations as well as conduct multi-national operations with partners with differing constraints and capacities. Current doctrine does not provide the operational commander the fundamental principles to prepare and plan for these operations in the international security environment. This paper proposes that the operational commander can overcome this challenge by using the ends, ways, means approach. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) can provide the operational commander the means to achieve interdiction objectives. This paper looks at the background of the PSI to provide context. Parallels with the complexities of recent counter-piracy operations are used to illustrate the similar challenges of WMD interdiction operations. Examples of PSI events show how the activity has provided a means. Guidance and existing doctrine for WMD interdiction are examined and evaluated. Finally, this paper proposes the ways (Logical Lines of Operation) the operational commander can use with the means of PSI to achieve the ends. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation is a serious threat to the security of the United States and the world. Globalization has made it easier for both state and nonstate actors to finance proliferation efforts and transfer WMD related materials and equipment. The increase of dual use technologies and equipment has made the interdiction of proliferation activities more complex. For example, equipment used to manufacture pharmaceuticals can also be used to grow biological pathogens. This increased threat combined with the post-911 security environment led the United States to develop the National Security Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. This document shifted the national strategy on counter-proliferation from passive deterrence to pre-emption. 1 The dramatic shift in WMD counter-proliferation policy raises numerous challenges for the Geographic Combatant Commander's mission to support National Strategy from the operational level. One challenge is working with coalition partners to conduct WMD interdiction operations. Coalition partners often have national authorities and rules of engagement that are vastly different from the United States. Another challenge faced is the perceptions of coalition partners. Activities the United States perceives as WMD proliferation may be seen as free trade or economic development by a partner nation.
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INTRODUCTION
Additionally, coalition partners are often not as prepared to conduct WMD interdiction.
They may not possess the planning expertise, information, or force capability to undertake these complex operations. 2 There is, however, a gap between the Combating WMD strategic guidance and the means available to the operational commander that must be bridged. The Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) must use the PSI not as a strategic enabler but as a means to combating weapons of mass destruction.
As stated above, the -margin of safety is shrinking.‖ The risk incurred by WMD proliferation or the occurrence of even a single WMD event is of grave concern to national and global security. Some may argue that the probability of a WMD event is low in comparison to other security threats but the consequences are too high. Due to the potential consequences of WMD proliferation the United States has embarked on a strategy of preemption and dedicated significant resources across the whole of government. The
Combatant Commanders, as the military operational arm of national power, are required to support this pre-emption strategy and the PSI provides the means. This paper will demonstrate how the operational commander can use the PSI as a means to support National Strategy. First, it will provide background on the PSI. Parallels with the complexities of recent counter-piracy operations will be used to illustrate similar challenges in the conduct of WMD interdiction operations. Examples from PSI events will show how the activity can provide means. Lastly, guidance and existing doctrine available to the operational commander to prepare for WMD interdiction operations will be examined and evaluated. Conclusions drawn from this analysis will be presented and recommendations
proposed. This paper will not examine the complexities of international law but assumes that the Combatant Commander's will work within the existing legal framework.
BACKGROUND
The PSI, a Department of State (DoS) led initiative launched in 2003, is a flexible framework that provides -more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed‖ 3 It is intended that these tools will be used within the confines of national legal authorities and international law. It is one of over 25 existing non-proliferation/counter-proliferation international measures. 4 However, The PSI is unique in that it is an activity -with teeth‖ conducted by international partners and not a formal treaty, international regime, or organization.
5
The PSI was started with 11 countries and has expanded to involve 93 participating nations. This activity may be considered to exist in three layers, the participating nations, the The Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP) provides the foundation of the PSI and is endorsed by all participant countries. In strategic terms, the purpose of the PSI is to stop proliferation through international cooperation. The PSI SOP calls on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:
1. Undertake measures to interdict transfer of WMD, delivery systems, and related items to/from state/non-state actors.
2. Adopt procedures to streamline information exchange.
3. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts.
4. Review and work to strengthen national legal authorities.
8
The first three principles can be leveraged by the operational commander to combat WMD.
Additionally, the DoS has provided three overall goals for the PSI: These goals can be used by the operational commander as the ends for WMD interdiction.
DISCUSSION
How are WMD interdiction and Counter-piracy Operations Similar?
The challenges faced by the operational commander to conduct WMD interdiction can be illustrated by drawing parallels with the complex problem of ongoing counter-piracy operations. These operations are so similar that one could take the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, remove the reference to WMD, and arrive at the same international principles for counter-piracy operations; interdiction, streamline information sharing, support interdiction efforts, strengthen national legal authorities. NATO has even used the term proliferation when referring to the increase in pirate activities off the coast of Somalia. 
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Interdiction and detection of pirates and WMD proliferators both require information.
In counter-piracy operations information is the way, or logical line of operation (LLOO) the operational commander uses to identify pirate intent, bases of operations, and conduct interdictions. When conducting counter-piracy operations, the forces providing maritime security must be able to determine intent. Vessels in the region may appear to be pirates but their intent may be innocent passage or fishing. Additionally, analysis of information can be used to understand pirate behavior; where and how they will strike. Understanding the pirate's behavior and patterns enables the operational commander to be better positioned to deter or interdict attacks. Coalition forces must also be able to obtain and share time critical information of an attack to support counter-force operations.
Similarly, the purpose of information sharing in WMD interdiction is not just to locate the -pirates‖ but is also used to indentify networks (e.g. the A.Q. Khan network), behavior patterns, and intent. As stated previously, the increase in dual use technology has made interdiction efforts even more complex. Knowing equipment or material is in transshipment does not meet the requirement to conduct an interdiction. It must be known that the consignee intends to use the equipment or material to develop WMD. Counter-piracy operations, like WMD interdiction have a deterrence objective. For both pirates and proliferators, the objective of deterrence is to make it too costly to continue to conduct these illegal activities. This is the modern day equivalent to the cold war deterrence policy of mutually assured destruction. At the operational level, the physical act of interdiction is an offensive deterrence method. A passive method of deterrence is force presence. However, with the immense area of the maritime domain (factor space) involved, force presence is a challenge. VADM Gortney, the CMFC, recently said that experience has shown that no one nation can secure every ocean and waterway around the world. 15 An increase in the international naval presence in the area has supported deterrence of piracy.
16
NATO recently stated -the deterrent effect of current deployments already seems to be producing positive results.‖ 17 The provision of naval forces by the international community increased force presence has provided the operational commander a way to deter illegal activity in the region.
The international community, through cooperation and commitment, has provided the means to counter-piracy. To counter WMD proliferation the PSI provides a pre-existing framework for similar cooperation and the follow on commitment to stop the illegal proliferation activity. From these means the operational commander can develop the ways. For counter-piracy operations the ways are unity of effort, information sharing, and interoperability.
How is the PSI "executed"?
The PSI is executed through activities or events. The CJCS Instruction, a policy document not doctrine, better defines the PSI.
However, the PSI is addressed as a stand-alone activity that will be supported by the GCC.
Discussion of the operational commander integrating or leveraging the PSI is limited to the following statement:
-It is recommended that GCCs incorporate PSI exercises scenarios into existing exercises when possible for ease of scheduling and budget considerations.‖
27
The CJCS policy is that the GCC will support the PSI in stand-alone events and should incorporate the PSI in existing exercises. To date, the only reference to the integration of the PSI into an existing exercise was PANAMAX 07. 28 Additionally, this instruction states that the GCC -will be prepared to conduct PSI interdiction operations as required or directed.‖ 29 However, as a policy document it lacks the -fundamental principles‖ required by the operational commander to prepare for these operations. can also use the PSI as a means to conduct WMD interdiction.
ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS
WMD interdiction, like counter-piracy operations, is a complex problem. Both problems require the operational commander to exchange timely information, and conduct operations with coalition members possessing differing authorities and rules of engagement.
Additionally, the operational commander must plan and conduct these operations within the framework of national and international laws. In counter-piracy operations, the surge in international cooperation is the operational commander's means; the resource to achieve the operational objectives. From the means, the operational commander developed the ways, the method of employing the means (see figure 1 ). In this case international cooperation as a means is employed by the operational commander through unity of effort and information sharing to achieve the objectives; detect, deter and interdict piracy. International cooperation as means has also provided the operational commander with the way to deter and interdict piracy through force presence. 
Figure 1
The means and the ends of counter-piracy and WMD interdiction are the same, international cooperation and detect, deter, and interdict respectively. The means required by the operational commander to conduct WMD interdiction operations pre-exist within the PSI.
As stated previously, the purpose of PSI is to stop proliferation through international cooperation. Analysis reveals the ways, or logical lines of operation (LLOO), to achieve the ends of WMD interdiction.
Information sharing is a LLOO for both counter-piracy and WMD interdiction operations. Information sharing mechanisms provide critical intelligence the operational
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commander can use to achieve the objectives; detect, deter and interdict. Information sharing also leads to the integration of TTPs among coalition forces. This mitigates coalition planning and SOP differences, overcomes the tactical complexities, and provides the operational commander with a more effective force by increasing inter-operability.
The counter-piracy mission is being -normalized‖ through the daily conduct of CTF 151 operations. Normalization is another LLOO the operational commander can use to overcome the challenges faced to conduct WMD interdiction. Normalization also mitigates coalition planning and SOP differences, overcomes the tactical complexities, and provides the operational commander a better understanding of coalition force capacity. Robert Joseph has observed that -Regular participation… that test capacities and legal authorities is a positive way to maintain our operational readiness against what are creative and clever adversaries.‖ 32 Additionally, the normalizing of operations results in a demand signal from the operational commander to the services that there is requirement to conduct this specific mission set. The Navy has responded to the normalization of counter-piracy operations by including specific training in the inter-deployment training cycle. Normalization of WMD interdiction operations would require the services to respond likewise, thereby providing the operational commander with a more capable force.
Security cooperation is the third LLOO for WMD interdiction. Currently, PSI exercises and events are stand-alone. This segregation of the PSI prevents the normalization of WMD interdiction into operations and limits partnership capacity building efforts.
Though policy states that COCOMS should include the PSI in exercises and training there is not much evidence to support that this has occurred. It may be argued that the PSI should not be integrated into existing exercises and that doing so will dilute their value. However, it is only necessary to ask what the credible threat is we are exercising to prevent? For example, is the United States more likely to be prepared to conduct a bi-lateral surface engagement with the Argentinean navy against Country Red or interdict proliferation attempts to FARC, Shining Path, or Hezbollah associated terrorist organizations in South America? The United
States military must continue to train how we fight. In the dynamic arena of international security the United States and coalition partners must be prepared to meet proliferation threats.
There is a doctrinal gap between strategic guidance and the means available for the operational commander to conduct WMD interdiction. The PSI provides the means.
Therefore the PSI must be included in Combating WMD doctrine. Inclusion of the PSI into doctrine as a means will result in development of the fundamental principles required to prepare and plan WMD interdiction as a non-proliferation and counter-proliferation operational task in the international security environment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the absence of doctrinal integration of the PSI with military operations the operational commander's must develop their own approach. Just as the Strategic guidance on Combating WMD uses the -ends, ways, means‖ approach, the operational commander can also use this approach. For the operational commander conducting WMD interdiction the -ends‖ are the operational objectives, the -ways‖ are the logical lines of operations, and the -means‖ is the PSI. The operational commander must use the PSI as a means to combat weapons of mass destruction. The ways that should be employed are information sharing, normalization, and security cooperation (see figure 2) . • Security Cooperation
• Information Sharing
• Normalize
Ends
• Stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related items to/from states or non state actors of proliferation concern.
• Make proliferation more costly and more difficult for the proliferators
• Reveal covert proliferation behavior and networks
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Figure 2
Also, valuable counter-piracy lessons learned on counter-piracy operations are being captured. Based on the similarities of the mission sets, many of these lessons learned such as those concerning overcoming coalition national constraints and ROE differences and the sharing of information are applicable. The operational commander should apply these lessons learned to better plan and prepare to conduct WMD interdiction efforts.
The Combatant Commander should also inject WMD interdiction across the spectrum of TSC events. This will result in the normalizing of WMD interdiction operations as well as increase partnership capacity. These WMD interdiction events should focus not just on the maritime environment but include air interdiction. Land interdiction is more unlikely due to HN sovereignty but can be offered for inclusion at HN request for US support.
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The Arrangement also provides a venue in which governments can consider collectively the implications of various transfers on their international and regional security interests. WA members maintain export controls on the WA Munitions and Dual-Use lists. Wassenaar also provides a forum for discussing security and conventional weapons nonproliferation issues that do not fall within one of the other, more established nonproliferation regimes.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT) is a treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, opened for signature on July 1, 1968. There are currently 189 countries party to the treaty, five of which have nuclear weapons: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the People's Republic of China (the permanent members of the UN Security Council).
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes. Though established independently of the United Nations under its own international treaty (the IAEA Statute), the IAEA reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The IAEA's mission is guided by the interests and needs of Member States, strategic plans and the vision embodied in the IAEA Statute (see below). Three main pillars -or areas of work -underpin the IAEA's mission: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and Verification.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material provides for certain levels of physical protection during international transport of nuclear material. It also establishes a general framework for cooperation among states in the protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material. Further, the Convention lists certain serious offenses involving nuclear material which state parties are to make punishable and for which offenders shall be subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is an agreement by 75 countries with a Statement of Principles and a Terms of Reference for Implementation and Assessment on 30 -31, October 2006. The International Atomic Energy Agency is invited to serve as an observer to the Initiative. It is intended to prevent terrorists from sourcing and using a nuclear bomb by employing many measures to protect fissile material and nuclear stockpiles. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) is an initiative housed within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). According to the CTR website, "the purpose of the CTR Program is to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states. -In recent years, the CTR program has expanded its mission from WMD at the root source to protecting against WMD "on the move" by enhancing land and maritime border security in the Former Soviet Union
The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) seeks to cooperate with countries where the smuggling threat is greatest to assist them to improve their abilities to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling. NSOI engages those countries seen to be at greatest risk of smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials in or through their territories. The NSOI team works with the government of each such country to jointly assess its strengths and shortcomings in its ability to combat the nuclear smuggling threat. This assessment focuses particularly on identifying gaps in existing capabilities and priority needs for improvement. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI)
The WMD-PPI seeks to bolster non-Russian FSU states ability to prevent proliferation of WMD across their borders. Increased efforts by terrorists to secure WMD and WMD components, materials, and expertise have demonstrated a need to improve the security of the non Russian FSU states' borders, to improve the ability of these states to investigate WMD-related thefts and smuggling, and to secure WMD materials within their borders.
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).
The mission of the GTRI is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI helps the Department of Energy achieve its Nuclear Security Goal (2.2.44) to prevent the acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials for use in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other acts of terrorism. Three key subprograms of GTRI -Convert, Remove, and Protect-provide a comprehensive approach to denying terrorists access to nuclear and radiological materials. Foreign Research Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program. The FRRSNF eliminates stockpiles of U.S origin spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors through repatriation to the United States.
Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR) Program. The RTR identifies, recovers, and stores, on an interim basis, certain domestic radioactive sealed sources as well as other radiological materials that pose a security risk to the United States and/or world community. The RTR also reduces the international threat posed by radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or -dirty bomb.‖
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was launched in 2002 by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security. Its purpose was to increase security for container cargo shipped to the United States. As the CBP puts it, the intent is to "extend [the] zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first."
The Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative (TECI). The TECI is a multifaceted, cooperative initiative that seeks to strengthen the trade compliance and export control systems of those countries and companies that constitute global transshipment hubs. By working to strengthen those systems, the Department of Commerce seeks to enhance security and confidence in international trade flows.
Megaports Initiative. Through the Megaports Initiative, NNSA works collaboratively with foreign partners to equip seaports with radiation detection equipment. Approximately 75 ports worldwide are targeted for implementation of the Megaports Initiative. The Megaports Initiative is a key component of a layered, multi-agency approach designed to prevent terrorists from acquiring, smuggling and using dangerous nuclear materials to develop a weapon of mass destruction or radiological dispersal device in an attack against the United States or its global partners.
